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Trivial Truths and the Aim of Inquiry
Nick Treanor
University of Cambridge
Take two true propositions:
grain of sand x is so-and-so-many millimetres from grain of sand y
stars are formed when massive clouds of molecular hydrogen collapse due to gravity
And put each behind a door. Is Inquiry indiﬀerent to which door she opens? No. Hence (or so we are 
told) truth is not the goal of inquiry, and not the only thing of epistemic value. Inquiry aims not just 
for more truth, but for signi!cant or important truth.
e argument is pervasive and in$uential. And it has the air of being obviously sound, so 
much so that it is given only impressionistically. Who could deny, after all, that Inquiry would pick 
the second door? And since she would, it must be more than truth that Inquiry is after. e following 
passages are typical, and convey a sense both of how this 'trivial truths' argument is employed and of 
how abruptly it is given:
I think that deep down we do all recognize that truth is not the only thing of epistemic 
value. Here is an easy demonstration. Take your favorite example of a well-established 
empirical theory, a theory you believe that we know. row in all the evidence on the basis 
of which we accept that theory. Depending on what theory you selected, this will likely add 
up to a substantial number of beliefs. Now, compare this set of beliefs with an equal number 
of [justi!ed true] beliefs about relatively simple arithmetic sums and about assorted elements 
of one’s stream of consciousness. I suspect that most of us would want to say that the !rst set 
of beliefs is better, epistemically better, than the second set. But the two sets contain the 
same number of true beliefs. (DePaul, 173)
We must not understand the thesis that truth is the basic goal of cognition in too simplistic 
a fashion. It is often pointed out that if the multiplication of truths were our sole cognitive 
goal, we could not better spend our time than by memorizing telephone directories. It was 
to avoid such implications that the focal aim at acquiring true rather than false beliefs was 
presented with the quali!cation “about matters that are of interest or importance to us”. 
(Alston, 32)
What is the goal of inquiry...? Something like: to get as much interesting and important 
truth about the world as possible. But the suggestion of uniqueness is misleading, since 'the' 
goal decomposes into two elements: truth, on the one hand, and interest or importance on 
the other. Obviously there is potential for tension between the two components, since it is a 
lot easier to get truths if one doesn't mind the truths one gets being trivial.” (Haack, 199)
My beliefs [in p1, a trivial proposition, and p2, a non-trivial proposition] are equals when it 
comes to the truth of their contents, and so they are equals when it comes to satisfying the 
truth goal, and so they are equals when it comes to the...(pro tanto) epistemic value of true 
belief....Nevertheless, it seems that there is some sense in which knowing p2 is a greater 
achievement than knowing p1, some sense in which the former belief is better than the 
latter. If so, we shall need an explanation of this: the pro tanto value of true belief cannot do 
the job. (Hazlett, forthcoming)
ere has been no attempt to state the argument precisely or to develop it in detail and with care, 
and it has met with no objection.1 It has rather ascended to orthodoxy in a single bound. As Dennis 
Whitcomb summarizes the now-standard view in the Continuum Companion to Epistemology:
It is better epistemically to know deep theoretical truths about e.g. metaphysics or physics, 
than it is to know trivial truths such as truths about the number of grains of sand on the 
nearest beach. Indeed, even if one were to know a lot of trivial truths, and thereby ful!ll the 
epistemic value of having more rather than less knowledge, one’s epistemic states would still 
be de!cient owing to their triviality. (forthcoming)
In the face of this argument, the challenges are many: If the goal of inquiry is not truth, as 
epistemologists have long supposed, what is it? What is the diﬀerence between trivial and non-trivial 
truths, and in particular, is the diﬀerence tied to, or independent of, our interests and cares? Is a 
teleological account of epistemic normativity still possible, if truth is but one source of epistemic 
value? And if so, what shape could it take?
e argument, however, is a bad one, even if it looks good in dim light. e problem is that 
it rests on an unrecognized but deeply implausible assumption concerning the relation between true 
sentences and the truths such sentences express. Moreover, there is no clear way to salvage the 
argument, once the trouble is revealed. It may be that the conclusion it reaches is true, that truth is 
not the goal of inquiry, or not the only thing of epistemic value. But the trivial truths argument itself 
is a very long way from establishing this.
1 Michael Lynch (e.g., 2005), among others, has objected to a distinct argument that is super!cially similar, 
which takes as a premise that some truths are not worth knowing at all. is argument is much less persuasive 
when the value in question is construed as purely epistemic and pro tanto, as opposed to practical or all-things-
considered. I think that, despite super!cial similarities, this is a very diﬀerent argument to the one I am 
focusing on and will not discuss it here.
To see the problem, start by considering a second case, in which we again put two true 
propositions behind the doors, but they are:
Aﬀan has a daughter
Aﬀan has a daughter and a son
Inquiry would again prefer the second door, since it is epistemically better, surely, to know that Aﬀan 
has a daughter and a son than to know only that he has a daughter, supposing, as we have, that he has 
both a daughter and a son. But this, we could all agree, would not show that Inquiry cares for 
anything other than truth. After all, what is behind the second door in this scenario is truth – just 
more of it. Not a proposition that is more true, for it is just as true – perfectly true – that Aﬀan has a 
daughter as it is that he has a daughter and a son. Rather, a proposition that is more truth, in the sense 
that if you know that Aﬀan has a daughter, but I know that Aﬀan has a daughter and a son, then I 
know more than you.2 Inquiry would prefer the second door, but that is no threat to the claim that 
what Inquiry wants is truth – the more the merrier.
But wait, one wants to say: is has nothing to do with the original argument. In this new 
scenario we have put two true propositions behind the second door: !rst, that Aﬀan has a daughter, 
and then, in addition, that Aﬀan has a son. As an objection to the trivial truths argument it is mere 
sleight of hand, since it rolls two propositions into one. ere is one truth behind each door, sure; 
but not merely one truth. What we need to compare are atomic truths, not complex truths such as 
that Aﬀan has a daughter and a son.
is response is correct to insist that if we set out to determine whether the aim of inquiry is 
more truth, and we do so by comparing pairs of true propositions with an eye to seeing whether 
inquiry is indiﬀerent toward learning one rather than the other, we had better be sure that each 
proposition is the same amount of truth. And it is correct to insist that we cannot be sure that each is 
the same amount of truth merely by noting that each is one truth, in the sense that every true 
declarative sentence expresses a truth. But the response is wrong to think there is an important 
2 More truth, not more of the truth. e latter is a claim about ratio, the former about absolute quantity. I 
think these amount to the same thing since how much is true is necessarily !xed and unchanging. But there is 
no need to argue that here.
diﬀerence between this new scenario, concerning truths about Aﬀan and his children, and the 
original scenario, concerning truths about sand and stars. We have no reason to think that what is 
behind any of the doors is an atomic truth.
What distinguishes the !rst scenario from the second is not that there is sleight of hand in 
the second scenario, but that there is sleight of hand in the !rst scenario. In the second scenario, there 
is no attempt to hide the fact that the proposition that Aﬀan has a daughter and a son is one truth 
but not merely one truth. Just the opposite: the surface grammar of the English sentence used to 
express that proposition makes it obvious that there is more than one truth there. What would be 
deceptive would be to express a complex proposition in a way that makes it look as if it is just one 
truth, which is exactly what happens in the original scenario.
Consider again the pair of truths put behind the two doors in that scenario:
grain of sand x is so-and-so-many millimetres from grain of sand y
stars are formed when massive clouds of molecular hydrogen collapse due to gravity
Is it plausible that either of these is an atomic truth? e word 'and' does not appear in either 
sentence. Nonetheless, it is not hard to see, once your attention is drawn to the question, that there is 
complexity here. Some of it is revealed in surface grammar, although not in as obvious a way as 
would be the case if each proposition were expressed in a sentence that employed the word 'and'. 
Behind the second door, for instance, are the truths that stars are formed, that they are formed from 
clouds of molecular hydrogen, that they are formed from clouds of molecular hydrogen that have 
collapsed, and so on. e English sentence that was in fact used to express the proposition does not 
employ the word 'and', but there are many English sentences that do employ 'and' that could have 
been used instead. e same holds for the !rst proposition, expressed originally by the sentence 'grain 
of sand x is so-and-so-many millimetres from grain of sand y'. On the most natural way to read what 
that sentence expresses, the same proposition could have been expressed by the distinct sentence 'x is 
a grain of sand and y is a grain of sand and x is so-and-so-many millimetres from y'. But that makes it 
three truths, not one. And there is further complexity that, while not quite revealed in surface 
grammar, is revealed by a straightforward expansion of it. For instance, doesn't 'x is a grain of sand 
and y is a grain of sand and x is so-and-so-many millimetres from y' really mean 'x exists and y exists 
and x is a grain of sand and y is a grain of sand and x is so-and-so-many millimetres from y'? But that 
would be !ve truths, not three. So how many truths are behind that door? One, three, !ve, or some 
other number?
In light of these problems, one might think a simple adjustment is in order. A careful look at 
the grammar of a sentence should reveal how much complexity there is, and in running the trivial 
truths argument we should be sure that we are not using sentences that are grammatically or 
syntactically complex, either blatantly or less obviously so. But there is a greater and more intractable 
problem that this simple adjustment leaves untouched: much complexity does not concern surface 
grammar at all.
Russell, in the course of answering a question that followed on some remarks he had made 
on negative facts, provides a nice example of the problem:
Question: Do you consider that the proposition ‘Socrates is dead’ is a positive or negative 
fact?
Mr. Russell: It is partly a negative fact. To say that a person is dead is complicated. It is two 
statements rolled into one: ‘Socrates was alive’ and ‘Socrates is not alive’. [215]
Set aside the negative versus positive facts issue; the exchange demonstrates that it is not obvious, 
even when we restrict ourselves to sentences that are atomic in form, when we are dealing with 
merely one true proposition and when with two or more, packaged up as one. When we consider the 
proposition that Aﬀan has a daughter and a son – or, more precisely, when we consider that 
proposition expressed in those words – complexity shows up in surface grammar. But as Russell’s 
reply reminds us, the absence of conjunctive structure in the language used to express a proposition is 
not a reliable guide – not even close to a reliable guide – to the complexity of the proposition 
expressed. As Russell put it elsewhere in the same course of lectures, natural languages do not “show 
at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied”, and they cannot, “if they are to serve 
the purposes of daily life”. [198] 
e error is easy to make. Recall how easy it was to think that:
Aﬀan has a daughter and a son
is two truths – that Aﬀan has a daughter, and that Aﬀan has a son. But we need only compare the 
!rst of these truths:
Aﬀan has a daughter
with this one:
Aﬀan has a child x and x is female
to see that the truth is not so simple.
What these remarks make apparent is something we have known all along, even if, in 
thinking about trivial truths and the aim of inquiry, we have found it easy to forget. Atomicity of 
vehicle is one thing, atomicity of content quite another. If this were not the case, it would be 
mysterious how someone who knows that John is a bachelor knows more than someone who knows 
merely that John is male. Or why a German who knows that Hannover erzielt den Anschlusstreﬀer 
doesn't know just half as much as an American who knows that Hannover scored a goal and that the 
goal brought Hannover within one point of being tied with their opponent. We see a word or 
linguistically atomic predicate and assume that, when it is said truly of an object, we have one truth. 
But every word brings a sea of truths with it. What is it to be a daughter? Or to be molecular 
hydrogen? Or to be a massive cloud of the stuﬀ collapsing due to gravity? As Wittgenstein put it in 
his notebooks, “words are like the !lm on deep water”. (May 30, 1915)
Let me emphasize that the worry pressed here does not rest on the assumption that every 
natural language predicate decomposes into some number of atomic predicates, or, more generally, 
on the assumption that every truth of the sort expressed in everyday sentences of natural language 
decomposes into some number of truths. I, for one, am skeptical of that, although I think it more 
easily ridiculed than refuted. Rather, all we need to accept is that we have not been oﬀered reason to 
think the individual truths contrasted in giving the trivial truths argument are the same amount of 
truth, and thus no reason to think Inquiry's preference for one over the other is a preference for 
something other than more truth. e implicit assumption is that each is one truth, so knowing each 
adds the same amount of truth to the stockpile. But that would be a reasonable assumption only if 
each were a single truth in more than name only.
To put the worry more generally, it seems obvious, upon re$ection, that ordinary sentences 
of natural language, when true, contain more or less truth, and how much truth they contain does 
not supervene on surface grammar. Moreover, it would be a miracle indeed if an arbitrarily chosen 
true sentence of English contained as much truth as some other arbitrarily chosen true sentence of 
English. A sentence is not a well-behaved measure. Sentences are rather like mouthfuls: just as you 
cannot measure how much whisky you have by passing the bottle around the room and counting 
how many swigs before the bottle is empty, you cannot measure how much truth you have by 
counting the the number of sentences you use to express it.  It is actually much worse than this, since 
at least the swigs are going to be roughly similar – the smallest swig and the largest swig won't vary by 
more than one order of magnitude, say, try as one will. But natural language shows profound, almost 
in!nite, compressibility.
What the trivial truths argument we have been considering needs, if it is to be successful, is a 
clear example of two truths, where each is the same amount of truth as the other, and where knowing 
the one truth is epistemically better than knowing the other. And to get that, we need a well-behaved 
measure on the truth expressed by true sentences. In current presentations of the argument we are 
oﬀered no reason at all to think the sentences used to express the truths express the same amount of 
truth. e implicit idea seems to be that the absence of super!cial conjunctive structure guarantees or 
at least makes reasonable the assumption that each is exactly one truth – not two or more truths 
“rolled into one”. But that idea is attractive only when it hides in the shadows.3
3 Early versions of this work were presented at the epistemology research group at the University of Edinburgh 
and to the Metaphysical Society at Trinity College Dublin. I am grateful to both audiences for generous and 
interesting discussion.
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